Fixing some computably enumerable theory T , the Friedman-GoldfarbHarrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary arithmetic, each Σ1 formula is equivalent to some formula of the form T ϕ provided that T is consistent. In this paper we give various generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular, for n > 1 we relate Σn formulas to provability statements [n] True T ϕ which are a formalization of "provable in T together with all true Σn+1 sentences". As a corollary we conclude that each [n] True T calls upon the oracle of all true Σn+2 sentences, the [n + 1] T recursively calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form n T φ. As such we obtain a 'syntax-light' characterization of Σn+1 definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended beyond the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability predicates [n + 1] T are well behaved in that together they provide a sound interpretation of the polymodal provability logic GLPω.
Introduction
In first order arithmetic we have natural syntactical definitions that correspond to finite iterations of the Turing jump. Recall that a sentence in first order logic in the standard language of arithmetic is Σ n+1 if it starts with a block of alternating quantifiers of length n + 1 where the leftmost quantifier is existential and where the block of quantifiers is followed by a decidable formula only containing bounded quantification. There are various results known that relate these formula classes to computational complexity classes.
For example, a set of natural numbers is many-one reducible to the n-th Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it is Σ n definable (on the standard model of the natural numbers). Likewise, a set of natural numbers is Turingreducible to the n-th Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it and its complement can be defined on the standard model of the natural numbers by a Σ n+1 formula. Similarly, a set of natural numbers is computably enumerable relative to the n-th Turing jump of the empty set if and only if it can be defined by a Σ n+1 formula.
In this paper we shall use the fact that various provability predicates are Turing complete in a certain sense so that we can give alternative characterizations for the finite Turing jumps. A central ingredient in proving our results come from generalizations of the so-called FGH Theorem.
The FGH Theorem (for Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington) tells us that for any c.e. theory T we have provably in Elementary Arithmetic that each Σ 1 sentence σ is equivalent to a provability statement of T , provided T is consistent. In symbols,
∀ σ∈Σ 1 ∃ψ EA ⊢ ♦ T ⊤ → σ ↔ T ψ .
Here, as usual T denotes a natural formalization of provability in T and the ♦ T stands for the dual consistency assertion. In this paper we give various generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular we prove that the theorem holds for the provability notion [n] T : provable in T together with all true Σ n+1 formulas. As a corollary we conclude that each [n] True T is Σ n+1 -complete. This observation yields us to consider a recursively defined hierarchy of provability predicates [ True T calls upon the oracle of all true Σ n+2 sentences, the [n+1] T recursively calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form n T φ.
As such we obtain a 'syntax-light' characterization of Σ n+1 definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended beyond the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability predicates [n + 1] T are well behaved in that together they provide a sound interpretation of the polymodal provability logic GLP ω .
Preliminaries
We shall work with theories with identity in the language {0, 1, exp, +, ·, <} of arithmetic where exp denotes the unary function x → 2
x . We define ∆ 0 = Σ 0 = Π 0 formulas as those where all quantifiers occur bounded, that is, we only allow quantifiers of the form ∀ x<t or ∃ x<t where t is some term not containing x. We inductively define Σ n , Π n ⊂ Π n+1 and Σ n ,
We shall write Σ n+1 ! for formulas ϕ of the form ∃x ϕ 0 with ϕ 0 ∈ Π n . We will work in the absence of strong versions of (bounded) collection B ϕ which is defined as
Therefore, we will consider the formula class Σ n+1,1 consisting of existentially quantified disjunctions and conjunctions of Σ n+1 formulas with bounded quantifiers over them.
To be more precise, we first inductively define
with • ∈ {∧, ∨} and Q ∈ {∀, ∃}. Next we define the Σ n+1,1 formulas to be of the form ∃x φ with φ ∈ Σ n+1,b . The theory of elementary arithmetic, EA, is axiomatized by the defining axioms for {0, 1, exp, +, ·, <} together with induction for all ∆ 0 formulas. The theory Peano Arithmetic, PA, is as EA but now allowing induction axioms for any first order formula.
It is well known that PA proves any instance B ϕ of collection so that in particular each Σ n+1,1 sentence is equivalent to some Σ n+1 sentence. Clearly we have that Σ n+1 ! ⊂ Σ n+1 . Using coding techniques, it is clear that each Σ n+1 formula is within EA equivalent to a Σ n+1 ! formula.
For us, a computably enumerable (c.e.) theory T is understood to be given by a ∆ 0 formula that defines the set of codes of the primitive recursive set of axioms of T . We will employ standard formalizations of meta-mathematical properties like Proof T (x, y) for "x is the Gödel number of a proof from the axioms of T of the formula whose Gödel number is y". We shall often refrain from distinguishing a syntactical object ϕ from its Gödel number ϕ or from a syntactical representation of its Gödel number.
We will write T ϕ for the Σ 1 ! formula ∃x Proof T (x, ϕ) and ♦ T ϕ for ¬ T ¬ϕ. By T ϕ(ẋ) we will denote a formula which contains the free variable x, that expresses that for each value of x the formula ϕ(x) is provable in T . Here, x denotes a syntactical representation of the number x.
By Σ 1 completeness we refer to the fact that for any true Σ 1 sentence σ we have that EA ⊢ σ. It is well-known that EA proves a formalized version of this: for any Σ 1 formula σ(x) and any c.e. theory T we have EA ⊢ σ(x) → T σ(ẋ).
The FGH theorem and generalizations
In this section we shall be dealing with various so-called witness-comparison arguments where the order of (least) witnesses to existential sentences is important. The first and most emblematic such argument occurred in the proof of Rosser's theorem which is a strengthening of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Rosser's Theorem). Let T be a consistent c.e. theory extending EA. There is some ρ ∈ Σ 1 which is undecidable in T . That is,
T ρ
and, T ¬ρ.
For rhetoric reasons we shall below include a standard proof of this celebrated result. Before doing so, we first need some notation. Definition 3.2. For φ := ∃x φ 0 (x) and ψ := ∃x ψ 0 (x) we define
Statements of the form φ ≤ ψ or φ < ψ with φ, ψ ∈ Σ n+1 are called witnesscomparison statements. Let us now collect some easy principles about witnesscomparison statements whose elementary proofs we leave as an exercise.
We would like to stress that it is actually quite remarkable that witness comparison arguments on statements involving Gödel numbering can be used to yield any sensible information at all, since by tweaking the Gödel numbering in a primitive recursive fashion we can always flip the order of the codes of any two syntactical objects. Of course, as we use fixpoints, after tweaking the Gödel numbering, the corresponding fixpoint also changes. But still, it is remarkable that the useful witness comparison information of the fixpoint cannot be destroyed by tweaking the underlying Gödel numbering.
We now turn our attention to another theorem, a proof of which can succinctly be given using witness comparison arguments: the FGH theorem. The initials FGH refer to Friedman, Goldfarb and Harrington who all substantially contributed to the theorem and we refer to [6] for historical details.
Basically, the FGH theorem says that given any c.e. theory T , any Σ 1 sentence is provably equivalent to a provability statement of the form T ϕ, modulo the consistency of T . The proof we give here is a slight modification of the one presented in [6] . The most important improvement is that we avoid the use of the least-number principle so that the proof becomes amenable for generalizations without a need to increase the strength of the base theory.
Theorem 3.4 (FGH theorem). Let T be any computably enumerable theory extending EA. For each σ ∈ Σ 1 we have that there is some ρ ∈ Σ 1 so that
Proof. As in [6] we consider the fixpoint ρ ∈ Σ 1 for which EA ⊢ ρ ↔ (σ ≤ T ρ).
Without loss of generality we may assume that σ ∈ Σ 1 ! so that both σ ≤ T ρ and T ρ < σ are Σ 1 . We now reason in EA, assume ♦ T ⊤ and set out to prove σ ↔ T ρ.
(→): assume for a contradiction that σ and ¬ T ρ. By Lemma 3.3.9 we conclude σ ≤ T ρ, i.e., ρ. By provable Σ 1 completeness we get T ρ.
(←): assume for a contradiction that ¬σ and T ρ. Again, we conclude
A very special feature of ρ from the above proof is that it is of complexity Σ 1 and that ¬ρ is implied a by a related Σ 1 formula. Thus, we clearly provably have ρ → T ρ but in general we do not have ¬ρ → T ¬ρ. But, due to the nature of ρ we have that T ¬ρ follows from the Σ 1 statement that is slightly stronger than ¬ρ, namely T ρ < σ: since provably ( T ρ < σ) → T ( T ρ < σ) and
The least number principle for Σ n formulas, LΣ n , says that for any ψ ∈ Σ n we have ∃x ψ(x) → ∃x (ψ(x) ∧ ∀ y<x ¬ψ(y)). Of course, using LΣ 0 and by Lemma 3.3.7, ¬ρ and ρ < σ are provably equivalent under the assumption that ρ∨σ.
We will be interested in generalizing the FGH theorem to Σ n formulas using ever stronger notions of provability. Visser's proof of the FGH theorem as presented in [6] used an application of the least number principle for ∆ 0 formulas in the guise of A → (A ≤ A). Thus, a direct generalization of Visser's argument to stronger provability notions would call for stronger and stronger arithmetical principles:
Lemma 3.5. The schema A → (A ≤ A) for A ∈ Σ n+1 ! is over EA provably equivalent to the least-number principle for Π n formulas.
However, since our proof of the FGH theorem did not use the minimal number principle, we shall now see how the above argument generalizes to other provability predicates. By [n + 1]
True T we will denote the formalization of the predicate "provable in T together with all true Σ n+2 sentences". For convenience, we set [0] T := T . Basically, for n > 0, the predicate [n]
True T ϕ will be a formalization of "there is a sequence π 0 , . . . , π m so that each π i is either an axiom of T , or a true Σ n+1 sentence, or a propositional logical tautology, or a consequence of some rule of T using earlier elements in the sequence as antecedents". Thus, it is clear that for recursive theories T we can write [n] True T by a Σ n+1,1 -formula. Also, we have provable Σ n+1,1 completeness for these predicates, that is: Lemma 3.6. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let φ be a Σ n+1,1 formula. We have that
where Q 1 y 1 <x 1 . . . Q k y k <x k is some block of bounded quantifiers. Thus, for some a we have
. Under the box, we can now replace each ∀ y i <x i by yi<xi and each ∃ y i <x i by yi<xi so that by applying distributivity we see that
is equivalent to a disjunctive normal form of bounded substitution instances of φ(a, y 1 , . . . , y k , x). Note that this operation in available within EA since it only requires the totality of exponentiation.
Outside the box we know that for some of these big conjunctions of bounded substitution instances of φ(a, y 1 , . . . , y k , x) actually all of the conjuncts are true. Since each of those conjuncts is a true Σ n+1 sentence, each conjunct is an axiom whence holds under the box. Thus, the whole conjunct is provable under the box whereby we obtain [n]
. . , y k , x) as was to be shown. It is clear that this case suffices for the more general form of Σ n+1,1 formulas.
It is easy to check that the predicate [n]
True T is well behaved. In particular one can check that all the axioms of the standard provability logic GL as defined in the last section hold for it. Over EA, the notion of [n] True T can be related to regular provability T by the lemma below.
By FinSeq(f ) we denote a predicate that only holds on numbers that are codes of a finite sequence of Gödel numbers and by |f | we denote the length of such a sequence. Moreover, f i will denote the ith element of such a sequence f . With True Σn+1 we will denote a partial truth predicate for Σ n+1 formulas and Tr Σn+1 will denote the set of true Σ n+1 sentences.
Lemma 3.7. For any c.e. theory T , we have that
Proof. We reason in EA fixing some ϕ. The ← direction follows directly from the formalized deduction theorem. For the other direction fix some p with Proof T +TrΣ n+1 (p, ϕ). We can express that p i is a true Σ n+1 sentence in a ∆ 0 fashion simply by saying that it is not a propositional tautology, nor an axiom of T , nor the result of applying a rule to earlier elements in the sequence. Thus, by ∆ 0 induction on the length of p we can prove that there is a sequence that collects all the true Σ n+1 sentences.
Note that our definition of [n]
True T is slightly non-standard since in the literature (e.g. [1] ) it is more common to define [n]
True T using a Π n oracle rather than a Σ n+1 oracle. With a Π n oracle one gets provable Σ n+1 completeness but in the absence of BΣ n+1 not necessarily provable Σ n+1,1 completeness. With our definition of [n]
True T , since A ≤ B ∈ Σ n+1,1 for A, B ∈ Σ n+1,1 , and since we provided a proof where the minimal number principle is avoided, the FGH theorem smoothly generalizes to the new setting.
Theorem 3.8. Let T be any computably enumerable theory extending EA and let n < ω. For each σ ∈ Σ n+1,1 we have that there is some ρ n ∈ Σ n+1,1 so that
Proof. The proof runs entirely analogue to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Thus, for each number n we consider the fixpoint ρ n so that
Note that both ρ n and [n] True T ρ < σ are Σ n+1,1 whence by Lemma 3.6 we can apply provable Σ n+1,1 completeness to them.
As an easy corollary we get that [n]
True T formulas are closed not only under conjunction, as is well know, but also under disjunctions. Note that the FGH theorem yields that provably n
True T ρ n we see that this is equivalent to [n]
Corollary 3.9. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let n ∈ N. For each formulas ϕ, ψ there is some σ ∈ Σ n+1 so that
Proof. We consider some σ ∈ Σ n+1,1 so that provably σ ↔ ([n]
True T ψ). By Theorem 3.8 applied to this σ we provably have that ([n]
As another corollary of Theorem 3.8 we see that, in a sense, the notion of n-provability is Σ n+1 complete. To establish this, we will first need a particular version of the fixpoint lemma. Lemma 3.10. Let ψ(x, y) be a formula whose free variables are amongst {x, y}. There is a formula ϕ(y) so that
Proof. The lemma easily follows from the well-known version of the fixpoint lemma by which for each formula ψ(x, y) there is a formula ϕ(y) so that
(e.g., the generalized diagonal lemma from Boolos' [2] , Chapter 3). By z = sub(u, v, w) we denote the formula that expresses that z is the Gödel number of the result of substituting the numeral of w for the variable whose Gödel number is v into the formula whose Gödel number is u. By ψ(x/z, y) we denote the result of substituting z for x in ψ(x, y). We now consider the formula ∃z z = sub(x, y , y) ∧ ψ(x/z, y) and apply Equation (1) to it to obtain the required fixpoint. Note that EA ⊢ ∃z z = sub( ϕ(y) , y , y) ∧ ψ(x/z, y) ←→ ψ( ϕ(ẏ) , y).
With this lemma we can now prove Σ n+1 -completeness of the [n]
True T provability predicate. 
A is definable on the standard model by a formula of the form [n]
True T ρ(ẋ) where ρ(x) ∈ Σ n+1,1 ;
Proof. The equivalence of 1, 2, and 3 is just Post's theorem.
The implication 5 ⇒ 4 is trivial, and implication 4 ⇒ 3 holds in virtue of [n]
True T being a Σ n+1,1 predicate which on N is equivalent to some Σ n+1 formula, so it suffices to prove 3 ⇒ 5.
Thus, let the number n be fixed and, let A be a set of natural numbers so that for some σ(x) ∈ Σ n+1 we have m ∈ A ⇐⇒ N |= σ(m). Using lemma 3.10 we find ρ n (x) ∈ Σ n+1,1 so that
Reasoning in EA, we pick an arbitrary x and repeat the reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3.8 to see that
Since EA is sound and by assumption of T also being sound we have for each n that N |= n True T ⊤, we may conclude that for any number m,
True T ρ n (m) which was to be proven.
Feferman showed in [3] that for each unsolvable Turing degree d there is a theory U so that the Turing degree of { ϕ | U ⊢ ϕ} is d. However, the theories that Feferman considered were formulated in the language of identity and in particular did not contain arithmetic. It is not hard to see that for theories that do contain arithmetic we can only attain degrees that arise as Turing jumps.
Lemma 3.12. Let A ⊆ N be definable on N by α(x) with Turing degree a. Then, the Turing degree of {ψ | EA + {α(n) | N |= α(n)} ⊢ ψ} equals a ′ .
Proof. Let us denote the Turing degree of a set B by |B|. We see that
since a Turing machine can enumerate all oracle proofs thereby reducing provability to the halting problem. Similarly, we see that
since we can code Turing machine computations in arithmetic.
We thus see that the Turing degrees of theories that are defined by a minimal amount of arithmetic (EA) together with some oracle, are entirely determined by the Turing degree of the corresponding oracle by means of the jump operator. By Friedberg's jump inversion theorem ( [5] ) we may thus conclude that any Turing degree above 0 ′ can be attained as the decision problem of a theory containing arithmetic.
In this light, Lemma 3.11 should not come as a surprise. However, in the lemma we have provided a natural subsequence of theories so that moreover, all the necessary reasoning for the reductions can be formalized in EA.
Lemma 3.11 is stated entirely in terms of definability and computability but the proof tells us actually a bit more, namely that the FGH theorem is easily formalizable within EA. Lemma 3.13. For any c.e. theory T we have that
Proof. One can simply formalize the proof of Theorem 3.8 which is easy since mapping the Gödel number of a Σ n+1 sentence σ to the Gödel number of its corresponding fixpoint ρ n is elementary.
Alternatively, using Lemma 3.10 we find ρ n (x) ∈ Σ n+1 so that
so that by reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3.11 we see that
For other notions of provability we get similar generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular, let [n] Omega T denote the formalization of the predicate "provable in T using at most n nestings of the omega rule". Following the recursive scheme [0] Omega T ϕ := T ϕ and,
we see that for c.e. theories T we can write [n] Omega T by a Σ 2n+1 -formula. Also, we have provable Σ 2n+1 completeness for these predicates, that is: Proposition 3.14. Let T be a computable theory extending EA and let φ be a Σ 2n+1 formula. We have that
Proof. By an external induction on n where each inductive step requires the application of an additional omega-rule.
This proposition is the omega-rule analogue of provable Σ n+1,1 completeness for the [n] True T predicate. As a corollary we get an FGH Theorem for omegaprovability.
Corollary 3.15. Let T be any sound computably enumerable theory extending EA and let n < ω. For each σ ∈ Σ 2n+1 we have that there is some ρ n ∈ Σ 2n+1,1 so that
We have formulated this corollary over PA so that Σ 2n+1,1 sentences are provably equivalent to Σ 2n+1 sentences using collection. Consequently, we can now also prove a definability result for the [n] Omega T predicate. 
ϕ.
The positive feature of the latter hierarchy is that it is defined solely in terms of provability whereas the former needs to call upon partial truth predicates.
As such the [n]
Omega T hierarchy is more amenable to Turing jumps beyond the finite where no clear-cut syntactical characterizations along the lines of Post's correspondence theorem are available (see [4] ).
The down-side to the [n]
Omega T hierarchy is that it runs outline with the Turing-jump hierarchy. In a forth-coming paper we propose a transfinite progression of provability notions in second order arithmetic that takes the best of both worlds: it is defined purely in terms of provability as in (4), synchronizes with the Turing-jump hierarchy as in Theorem 5.2, and can be transfinitely extended along any ordinal Ξ definable in second order logic yielding for a large class of second order theories a sound interpretation of a well-behaved logic called GLP Ξ as in Theorem 5.4.
We end this section with some remarks on the fixpoint used in the proof of the FGH theorem. By no means, this fixpoint is the only one that works. The minor change where we consider ρ ↔ (σ < ρ) works with almost the same proof. But we also have a 'dual' version of our fixpoint which gives the desired result.
Lemma 3.17. Let T be a c.e. theory and let σ ∈ Σ 1 .
But from our assumption σ we get by the minimal number principle that σ ≤ σ so that ( T ¬ρ ≤ σ)∨(σ < T ¬ρ) whence by (2) we get σ < T ¬ρ. By provable Σ 1 -completeness we get T (σ < T ¬ρ) whence T ¬ρ. ←: If T ¬ρ and ¬σ, then T ¬ρ ≤ σ whence ρ and by Σ 1 completeness T ρ so that T ⊥.
Since this proof uses the minimal number principle, it is not amenable for generalizations to stronger provability notions over a weak base theory. The following fixpoint does allow such generalizations. Note that the two lemma's are very similar yet not necessarily equivalent since fixpoints involving the witnesscomparison relation are in general not closed under substituting logical equivalents.
Lemma 3.18. Let T be a c.e. theory and let σ ∈ Σ 1 .
Proof. Again, we reason in EA now avoiding the minimal number principle.
→:
←: Suppose T ρ and ¬σ. Then, T ρ < σ whence also T ( T ρ < σ). Thus T ¬ρ, which together with the assumption that T ρ yields T ⊥.
An algebraic perspective
In this section we shall recast the generalized FGH theorem in algebraic terms. Let us fix some c.e. theory T . The generalized FGH theorem tells us that Σ n+1 sentences are almost equivalent to sentences of the form [n] It is well know that there are plenty of such sentences. For example, the structure of Σ 1 sentences within the Lindenbaum algebra of any consistent c.e. theory is known to be densely ordered by the following folklore fact which can be readily proven by an application of Rosser's Theorem. Fact 4.1. Let T be a c.e. theory. For any two Σ 1 sentences σ 0 , σ 2 so that T ⊢ σ 0 → σ 2 but T σ 2 → σ 0 , there is some σ 1 which lies strictly in between σ 0 and σ 2 . That is,
Proof. Since T σ 2 → σ 0 , we know that T + ¬σ 0 + σ 2 is consistent and will consider the corresponding Rosser sentence ρ ∈ Σ 1 as in Theorem 3.1. Now,
Before we recast the FGH theory in terms of algebras we need some additional notation. Let Σ n+1,1 /≡ T denote the set of T -equivalence classes of Σ n+1,1 sentences and likewise, let [n] T F /≡ T denote the set of T -equivalence classes of sentences of the form [n]
By Corollary 3.9 we can define
This map ∨
[n] naturally extends to [n]F /≡ T and substructures thereof. Likewise, we define
True T (ϕ ∧ ψ). With this notation the FGH theorem can be reinterpreted in terms of algebras.
Lemma 4.2. For any c.e. theory T , the algebras
define the same subalgebra of the Lindenbaum algebra of T .
Proof. This follows directly from the above considerations. We can map σ to [n + 1]
True T ρ n+1 as in the FGH theorem to establish a natural map on different representations of the same equivalence class within the Lindenbaum algebra of T .
Graded provability via Turing jumps
We shall now see how the FGH theorem can be used to define graded provability notions [n] T for n ∈ N which are defined using only provability notions yet which are Σ n+1 complete very much in the same way as Lemma 3.11 told us that the [n]
True T predicates are Σ n+1 complete. Recall that on the natural numbers we have
True T is nothing but T . It is easy to see that this equivalence is provable within PA. The idea now is to replace true Π n+1 sentences by consistency statements, that is, by sentences of the form n T ϕ. This replacement will be done in a recursive fashion. Thus we can consider the following recursive scheme.
[0] T φ := T φ, and [n + 1]
For this recursive scheme, we can easily prove various desirable properties. However, for the sake of generalizing the definition to the transfinite setting, we choose to consider a more involved recursion.
[0] T φ := T φ, and
We shall now prove that this provability notion [n] T is actually provably very similar to that of [n] True T for any natural number n. Proof. For the sake of readability we shall omit the subscripts T in this proof. Item 1 : This direction is easy, since by induction on n we see that each n T ψ is of complexity Π n+1 . True Πn+1 (π) → ϕ we also have the weaker n True ρ → ϕ . Thus we have n True ρ ∧ n True ρ → ϕ so that by applying twice the induction hypothesis we get n ρ ∧ n ρ → ϕ and by definition [n + 1] ϕ as was to be shown.
Item 3: For n = 0 the statement holds by definition and for n + 1, the statement follows from the previous item since EA ⊢ [n + 1]
True n True ⊤. Item 4: follows directly from the previous from the soundness of EA and T .
We shall see below that [n] T provability is a very decent provability notion. Theorem 5.2. Let T be a c.e. theory. We have for all A ⊆ N that the following are equivalent Corollary 5.3. Let T be a c.e. theory extending EA and let n ∈ N. For each formulas ϕ, ψ there is some σ so that
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5.2 since c.e. sets (with or without oracles) are closed under both conjunctions and disjunctions.
As a matter of fact, it turns out that this corollary can be formalized being one of the corner stones in a proof to the extent that the provability logic concerning the [n] predicates is nice. In particular, let GL be the normal modal logic axiomatized by (A → B) → ( A → B) and ( A → A) → A and all propositional tautologies with rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation: The proof proceeds by a straightforward induction on n considering the logics GLP n+1 that have only modalities up to [n] .
